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I. Introduction
Traditionally, in both German Corporation [1] and Stock Exchange Law
[21, there have been no provisions against insider trading. However, during the
1960s, various groups began to consider including a ban on insider trading as
a part of stock exchange law. They settled ultimately on devising voluntary
Insider Trading Guidelines [3]. The evaluation was motivated by the growing
reluctance of investors to support the traditional stock market and the increase
of significant losses for uninformed investors in the public limited partnership
ventures. No statutory provisions were actually agreed upon and implemented.
Indeed, although there is acceptance by major business and banking associa-
tions on adherence to the German Insider Trading Guidelines of 1971, there is
by no means uniform support.
1.1. Policy Debate in Germany
The most striking aspect of the lack of uniform acceptance and resulting
policy debate is the rare formation of blocks of opinions. The position of
German lawyers, which lies almost without exception between reserve and
criticism [4], is in complete contrast to the almost unanimously positive
opinion of the profession [5]. The review panel for the study of basic problems
in banking, which has also dealt with this problem, is divided into majority
and strong minority opinions [6]. In essence, the difficulties involved in
striving for an optimum solution exacerbate the persisting differences of
opinion. The laywers are disturbed, above all, by the fact that a few "black
sheep" come away from the system of the Insider Trading Guidelines not only
unshorn but acting in a legal manner. The profession, in contrast, remains
satisfied with the correct behavior of the many. The few, who, despite the
disapproval of their colleagues, contrive to carry out insider trading, would
most certainly not be checked by the much delayed attack of the public
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prosecutor and a ponderous court case. Above all, the burdens arising for the
stock exchange and capital market from such a law would bear no relation to
the uncertainty of its success. Finally, just as in every technical quality control,
the effort required to reach the last five percent of faultlessness is dispro-
portionately high and to reach one hundred percent is prohibitive.
Questions which then arise include: How are members of management who
make insider deals dealt with in Germany? How should a foreigner in
Germany who is a member of management of a German subsidiary company
behave? Out of what legal policy issues have the insider trading restrictions
developed?
1.2. Development of the Guidelines
While the Federal Republic of Germany has the Stock Corporation Act of
1965, which has been commended for its advanced approach to regulating
corporate structures, the legislation failed to develop uniform provisions to
protect investors' rights in the capital market [7]. The Stock Corporation Act
outlines the responsibilities of officers and directors of corporations and
establishes the rights of shareholders. Such rights, however, yield limited
protection during the period of initial issuance and no regulation of the
secondary securities market.
The Ministry of Economics created a fiasco with its 1967 Stock Exchange
Act reform proposal [8]. As a result, the Panel of Stock Exchange Experts [9]
initiated stock exchange reform which focused on methods of self-control in
1968. The actual Guidelines were drafted and proposed in November 1970.
The business and financial community quickly gave the Guidelines their
support, partly based on their conviction of the appropriateness of the
proposal and partly to avoid more restrictive legislation. In November 1974 a
parliamentary hearing took place, but on a limited level without disagreeable
critics from academia. No action was taken then or in the intervening twelve
years [10]. Neither can it be reasonably foreseen in the near future.
The recommendations of the Panel of Stock Exchange Experts were taken
up promptly by the leading business and banking associations as well as by
the working party of the German stock exchanges. These organizations con-
tinue to be the principal supporters of the Insider Trading Guidelines. They
have devised and written Semi-Official Commentaries to the Insider Trading
Guidelines and to the Guidelines for Dealers and Investment Advisers. At the
end of 1971, they structured a Code of Procedure to implement the Guide-
lines.
This paper will examine the treatment of insider trading under German law
[11]. The second section will analyze the existence and range of substantive
insider trading prohibitions. The Insider Trade Guidelines will be confronted
with respective critical and further-reaching ideas of jurisprudential literature,
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including the proposal of a law against unfair stock exchange dealings pro-
posed by a group of private professors [hereinafter referred to as Model Law]
[121. The third section will evaluate current methods of regulation of insider
trading, while the fourth section will discuss the effectiveness of the en-
forcement of the regulations and the outlook for the future.
2. The Insider Trading Guidelines and Present Statutory Law
2.1. The Legal Character and the Content of the Guidelines
2.1.1. The Legal Character of the Guidelines
Unconventionally thought out by the well-known economist Stuetzel, and
pragmatically put into effect by the profession, the Insider Trading Guidelines
have a legal character which is difficult to understand.
The Guidelines are not legal rules of the state; they are not even trade
usages, which under German law could have a semi-mandatory character.
They were conceived and accepted by those involved in the stock market and
insider trading problem as merely voluntary rules to which insiders can both
submit and withdraw. Submission is done by means of private contracts [13].
Such contracts are concluded between companies and the insiders belonging to
these companies, generally members of management, and these contracts
provide for recognition and adherence to the Guidelines and the Code of
Procedure together with the respective Semi-Official Commentaries. In actual
business practice, the Guidelines are usually a part of the original contract of
employment. While self-regulation is usually put into practice under charters
and resolutions of associations, conditions of licenses, and policies or recom-
mendations of the organization [14], in this case there is a quite unique
construction of parallel (though individual) contracts for the recognition of
directives or codes of behavior seeking to accomplish the same objectives. In
the event that there is no employment contract, such as with members of the
supervisory board, a special arrangement is made. Inasmuch as companies
themselves are insiders under the terms of the directives, such as credit banks,
they recognize the Guidelines and the procedure, vis-h-vis their head associa-
tions, as binding on them [15]. For their own members of management, the
credit banks themselves are the contracting parties.
The leading associations of business and finance set up review panels for
each stock exchange. The review panels determine whether there has been a
violation of the Insider Trading Guidelines by establishing the facts of a case.
However, they cannot decide about sanctions or possible litigation, according
to German law, because they are merely assessors in the arbitration between
the company and its member of management bound by the Guidelines [16]. If
the review panel establishes a breach of the trading prohibition [17]. the
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company or the credit bank and the responsible ministry are informed [18].
The principal sanction is turning the unjust profits over to the company [19].
Neither penal sanctions nor civil liability are applied [20]. In the case of a
serious violation, which has considerable consequences and involves gross
negligence of the insider, publication of the case could be made without the
consent of the insider [21].
2.1.2. The Content of the Guidelines
An initial survey of the contents of the Guidelines reveals a basic prohibi-
tion of insider trading [221. Insiders are principally members of the manage-
ment, including the executive board of the company and associated domestic
companies [23]; domestic shareholders of greater than twenty-five percent
participation [24]; certain employees of the company and its domestic associ-
ates [25]; credit banks and their supervisory board members, directors, and
informed employees [26]. Overseas parent and subsidiary companies do not
come under the voluntary Guidelines due to the burdens it would place on
them; and voluntary submission could not easily be expected, overseas busi-
ness and the international relationships would be impaired, and enforcement
would be difficult. Receivers of tips are also not included [27].
In contrast, the jurisprudential comments define the word "insider" more
widely. Under the Model Law, an insider is "whoever as shareholder by virtue
of his position in the enterprise or due to his office or profession possesses
knowledge that is not usually available" about matters relating to the liquidity
of the company. Thereunder not only are enterprise insiders included, but also
auditors, credit banks (without the limitation that they are engaged by the
company in particular tasks), investment and property advisors, and further,
in accordance therewith, leading officials of the Ministry of Finance, journa-
lists, etc. The receivers of tips, however, are not included under the Model Law
as under the Guidelines [28].
Insiders are not permitted to make deals in insider stock to their own or a
third party's advantage based on information that they have obtained due to
their particular position [29]. Insider information is first broadly defined as
knowledge of circumstances which have not been made or become public
which could influence the value of insider stock [30]. Then the Guidelines set
forward a conclusive list of specific information [31].
The jurisprudential literature pleads in contrast for a more general defini-
tion. The Model Law defines inside information as "not generally available
information on the circumstances of the company which could have an effect
on the value of the shares of the company" [32]. The yardstick by which the
relevance of the information must be determined is whether stockbrokers or
investment advisers would attach a meaning to the knowledge that speaks for
itself [33]. Certain measures which require immediate publication (such as
dividend proposals, capital increases and decreases, foundation of joint owner-
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ship enterprises, all further measures so far as they affect substantially the
structure of the company) or quarterly reports are eo ipso considered to have
an effect on the evaluation [34]. The method of enumeration is also applied
here, but, in contrast to the Insider Trading Guidelines, its purpose is to
establish that certain information is relevant by all means. The certainty of the
law is also thereby encouraged [35].
Insider securities are comprised of shares which are officially quoted at the
stock exchange or included in the semi-official dealings at the stock exchange.
In addition, the term covers iecurities similar to shares, namely rights of
participation in net profits, convertible bonds and profit debentures, and
options and preference shares [36]. The term does not cover bonds, however.
There is less opportunity for bonds to be involved because inside information
occurs more seldom and has less effect on the value, though the problem does
exist in the international market [37].
These contractual regulations do not prohibit members of management
from purchasing, possessing, and selling shares in their own company. but
they prohibit deals made by exploiting inside information [38]. The availability
of such activities is important, due to the particular meaning and desirability
of the commitment of members of management to the operations of their own
company [39].
What about the issue of tips? It is clear that the receiver of tips, lacking the
characteristics of an insider as defined in the Insider Trading Guidelines,
cannot be included in the prohibitions. As far as the member of management
giving the tip is concerned, it depends on the extent to which, by giving the
tip, he makes a deal through a third party (" to have made by others"). This
concept will be understood by some as "to tolerate", in which case the giving
of the tip, as far as the giver of the tip is concerned, falls under the prevention
of insider trading [40]. Yet it seems more correct to see in it an element of
"soliciting"; the third parties must have been induced by the outsider to make
the deal. If the third party has made the deal as a free agent, which is often the
case when tips are given, then the person giving the tip is not caught by the
Guidelines [41].
In contrast, the Model Law introduced a prohibition of tipping explicitly
[421. Above all, however, there is unanimity that the problem of insider
transactions of credit banks is much more complicated than the exception
contained in the Insider Trading Guidelines [43]. This does not concern the
insider deals of credit banks themselves which must be forbidden like those of
other insiders. Rather, it focuses on the question to what extent credit banks
are allowed to use, or under certain conditions (e.g., in order to avert loss to
their clients) must use, inside information for the benefit of these clients.
There are three exceptions to prohibited transactions which are listed in the
Guidelines. First, transactions made as a result of instructions exempt the
participant, though not the instructor [44]. Second, transactions within the
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framework of the objectives of the company set out in the articles of incorpo-
ration are exempt [45]. This would include the direct purchase of shares on the
market in order to form the basis of an already planned take-over. Otherwise,
such take-overs would arise from inside information and be banned [46].
Third, the transactions in furtherance of clients' interests or within the
framework of otherwise normal trading in securities of the credit bank remain
untouched [47].
2.2. Insider Trading and Present Statutory Law
Even though insider trading currently is not regulated directly by company
and stock exchange law in Germany, there are one or two limited and not yet
tested possibilities of attacking insider trading by means of present statutory
law. It must be made clear to the foreign observer, however, that this is a
matter of the potential interpretation of certain Acts. Though the legal
literature has encouraged the attempted use of the law in this manner, courts
have not been able to work on the matter due to lack of complainants. Of
course, if there were complainants, it is still open to speculation as to whether
the courts would move in this direction. Presumably they would not do so
readily and not at all in the first few cases.
2.2.1. Criminal Prosecution of Insider Trading
The Stock Corporation Act explicitly prohibits violation and exploitation of
business secrets by members of the executive board and the supervisory board,
liquidators, auditors, and their assistants [48]. They are liable for the un-
authorized disclosure of secrets of the company, particularly when trading in
secrets for money or with the intention of personal gain for self or another
[49). Authorized sanctions include fine or imprisonment. However, this provi-
sion, as well as the others, arises exclusively in cases where a complaint is
made by the company itself [50]. This is the primary reason why the provisions
have not yet been applied by state prosecutors and courts in the prosecutions
of alleged insider trading [51].
In addition, the general criminal laws on fraud and fraudulent conversion
might be applicable to hard core cases [52]. The decisive element of deceit is
deception. Unfortunately, it has been hard to postulate deceit for insider
dealing cases since a legal duty of disclosure seems questionable. In the case of
fraudulent conversion, the two critical elements of the offense are breach of
trust and loss of property of the company. Though a breach of trust generally
could be demonstrated, the company rarely suffers an explicit loss of property.
The statutes on fraudulent conversions, therefore, would be difficult to apply.
2.2.2. Civil Liability for Insider Trading
In civil law [53], rescission due to fraudulent misrepresentations and
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liability for damages could be considered [54]. There is only one decision of
the Reichsgericht on point. In the decision of February 3, 1904, it was decided
that fraudulent misrepresentations had been committed when a banker offered
mining shares at the quoted price of the day even though he knew that the
mine had been flooded [55]. The decision is supported by far-reaching, present
day duty of disclosure in general [56], and for banks in particular [57],
regarding transactions made directly rather than through the stock market. Of
course, the argument against the liability, and therefore the criticism of the
decision, is that it must remain possible to exploit better market knowledge
and painstakingly acquired information [58]. This is also an example of
damages to the company. According to a specific provision in the Stock
Corporation Act, an auditor and his assistants are liable to pay damages in the
case of insider dealings in shares of a company or companies belonging to a
group [59].
2.2.3. Company Law and the Surrender of Profits
If one considers the duty not to exploit insider information as falling under
the duty of trust towards the company and of not exploiting secrets [60], then
it would be possible to develop a duty to hand over profits from such
transactions, regardless of assessed damages. Under both the Stock Corpora-
tion Act [61] and the general principles of the law of agency [62], the member
of management has exploited the company secrets for himself, thereby damag-
ing the interest of the company and its shareholders. There would be no
intolerable accumulation of damages and profits to hand over since a realized
claim for damages of the party not informed would, to that extent, diminish
the profit of the insider.
2.2.4. Disclosure
Action for disclosure against insiders could be realized under present law.
On the one hand, it could be inferred that the member of management had the
duty of disclosure of inside trading to the company arising from his duty of
trust [63]. On the other hand, one could easily imagine that it would be
possible to apply the right to information of shareholders in general meetings,
arising from company law [64], to the insider trading of members of manage-
ment.
In summation, it would be possible to develop a relatively extensive system
of insider law, if it were desired, without a special statutory provision on
insider trading and where none of the four principal methods of regulation
[65] would be excluded. Only the establishment of particular commissions or
organizations [66] for regulation could not be developed in that manner.
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3. Methods of Regulation: Policy Aspects
3.1. The Use of Penal Sanctions against Insiders
The Insider Trading Guidelines cannot rely on the criminal justice system
for support. Because it is a non-statutory, unsanctioned, voluntary missive,
conceived by an unofficial body, it cannot look to criminal law for protection
of its violations. The general commentaries are silent on the matter, and there
are no cases on point.
In the jurisprudential literature, the opinions are divided, even among the
specialists in criminal law. Some hold the view that there are one or more
elements of a criminal offense in insider deals [67]. Others are of the opinion
that the problem must be solved by non-criminal sanctions for the time being
[68]. This lack of agreement is in strong contrast to the certainty with which
France and England have opted for a criminal penalty of up to two years in
prison for insider offenses [69]. It is particularly remarkable for England,
where a long tradition of voluntary self-regulation has existed.
It has been suggested, therefore, that Germany officially combine the
voluntary Guidelines with a very narrowly drafted state regulation for the
serious insider cases which are true financial crimes. The Guidelines would be
sufficient for the regular cases of insider trading and its abuses. The theory of
such a regulation, however, has been argued against for three reasons. For one
thing, the cooperative parts of business and banking would no longer wish to
cooperate. Secondly, informational secrets and insights would fall into the
hands of the state prosecutor and possibly be used against the businesses and
banks in other matters. Thirdly, the prosecutions for white collar crime are
anything but encouraging [70].
3.2. Transfer of Profits
The transfer of profits to the company which suffered from the insider
trading is the principal sanction of the Insider Trading Guidelines. All asset
advantages derived from the violation, including avoided losses, must be
transferred to the company [71]. In order for a company to maintain a
successful claim for the transfer of profits, it must have a contract with the
insider which recognizes and submits to the Guidelines. In the case of credit
banks, the company that has a right of claim is the one whose securities are the
subject of the insider deal. A contract of recognition between a credit bank
and on the one side the head associations and on the other its own insiders is
for this purpose treated as a contract in favor of a third party [72].
A company is under a duty to exercise its claim for transfer of profit before
a court unless the pecuniary circumstances of the company or some other
important reason prevents it [73]. There is a statute of limitations of three
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months after the management of the company discovers the trading, or five
years after the actual event [74]. Should the company fail to exercise its
prerogative in time, it loses the claim; no other insider sanctions are available.
If the company prevails in its claim, the gain in property derived by the
insider from the prohibited trading must be transferred to the insider's own
company rather than the seller or combined enterprise that suffered the
damage. Passing the profits to the third party that was not directly involved
then represents a penalty in the contract rather than in a damage assessment
[75].
The jurisprudential literature has proposed a more far-reaching profit
penalty which is set at twice the amount of the profit derived from the trading.
The penalty would benefit all others participating on the market who dealt in
the securities without the inside information [76]. Of course, such a regulation
would create a multitude of fragmented claims of those participating in the
market. In order to compensate for these splinter claims, the penalty proposal
is coupled with the assignment of the claims to an administrator who pursues
them according to a procedure similar to that for bankruptcy [771. Though the
proposal is original and thought-provoking, it may not be pragmatic in terms
of application. For instance, if the trading involves many small claims rather
than a big market killing [78], the costs of distribution bear no relationship to
the amounts due to each claimant. In that case the proposal cannot be justified
because it merely burdens the insider and does not profit the individual
claimant. It would be preferable to attempt the traditional method of transfer
of profit found in agency law.
3.3. Civil Liability
The unofficial, voluntary Guidelines do not provide for civil liability though
they do not exclude it. In the jurisprudential literature, the value of liability
for damages under civil law is in dispute. The company whose securities were
traded can only claim damages in the form of a transfer of profits because it
usually suffers no material damage. A claim for damages by the party to the
contract, who is not aware of the facts, makes sense in the case of non-stock
exchange transactions and is certainly de lege lata possible [79]. This is
different in the case of transactions made on the stock exchange. There the
recipient of the deal is a matter of chance. The trader becomes the final
beneficiary of the insider information and everyone else who traded on the
market at the prevailing rate is left with no recourse [80].
3.4. Disclosure
Disclosure as a method of regulation of insider trading exists only peripher-
ally in Germany. The Guidelines do not provide for a particular reporting
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procedure for all dealings in securities by insiders, unlike the statutory
regulations in the U.S. [81]. If a violation occurs, the review body of the stock
exchange informs the legal representatives of the company, the chairman of
the supervisory board or his deputy, and the president of credit banks
affected, in addition to the federal minister responsible for the stock ex-
changes. In the case of gross negligence and massive abuse, the result of the
review can be publicized without the consent of the trader [82]. Publication
means that the review body gives notification of the result of the review to the
press, though the cost is not provided and therefore publication is unlikely
[831. Such a step requires not only a hearing for the insider and the unanimity
of the review board in its fact finding, but also a pertinent reason for
publication supported in written detail. It must include the level of abuse and
the personal and professional concerns of the person who took advantage of
the inside information in order to benefit from the prohibited trading. If the
affected party takes steps against the resolution of the review body through the
courts within six weeks, the publication must be held in abeyance until the
case has been acted upon by the court.
The jurisprudential literature agrees with the Guidelines in that the pillory
should not be a sanction. On the other hand, the media is entitled to the facts
and results of a review. Recently, review bodies have accommodated both
concerns by holding discussions with the press while protecting the rights and
privacy of the insider.
Recommendations for a system of reporting of all dealings in securities by
insiders cover two stages: from the insider to his company, and from the
company to the stock exchanges [84]. Such a process would demand that the
company keep its secrets efficiently, which meets with the approval of the
exchanges [85]. However, in German companies which are subject to co-de-
termination on the supervisory board, employees claim the right of speedy and
full information despite legally established board secrecy. Sharing information
on insider trading with workers' committees and the staff would make it
impossible to keep the information from leaking, thus violating the insider's
rights and privacy [86].
4. Enforcement, Effectiveness, and Outlook for Insider Trading Regulation in
Germany
4.1. Enforcement of the Insider Trading Guidelines
Currently, the Insider Trading Guidelines are enforced only by means of
non-statutory review bodies which are established at the various stock ex-
changes. Each review panel consists of a chairman and four assessors who are
responsible for reviewing the alleged violations of the Insider Trading Guide-
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lines and the Guidelines for Dealers and Investment Advisers. The chairman is
a judge who is experienced in commercial matters, while the assessors are
drawn from the employers in the financial trading world and from those who
deal professionally in securities on the stock exchange. Rather than being
appointed, they are elected by the members of the stock exchange licensing
authority.
The review procedure begins as a result of a denunciation (including
self-denunciation) or ex officio if circumstances make an abuse appear conclu-
sive, supported by credible and concrete facts. It is not the duty of the review
body to investigate the suspicious facts in that instance. If, however, there is
strong suspicion of abuse regarding insider trading and if the suspicion is not
directed against a particular person or group of persons, the review body can
resolve to obtain information relating thereto from all persons who might have
something to do with it. Such information includes whether and at which
credit bank they have placed insider securities during the three months before
the coming to light of the insider information, and which transactions in
insider securities they have made or commissioned. This investigation is
subject to whether the persons questioned have voluntarily submitted to the
Guidelines.
The actual review procedure then consists of a preliminary hearing followed
by a principal one. The necessary investigations in order to obtain evidence for
the principal hearing are undertaken by outsiders appointed by the review
body. The outsiders might include auditors, accountants, or members of
management. The review body then evaluates the facts gathered for it and
comes to a formal decision. The decision consists of a written opinion as to
whether there has been insider trading in violation of the Insider Trading
Guidelines, whether it can be satisfactorily proven, and whether and to what
extent costs should be awarded. The review body, however, does not decide on
whether and what type of legal claims could arise from the established facts.
The original Guidelines and Code of Procedure were initially criticized, in
spite of their acceptance, as being too narrow, so they were broadened and
improved in 1976 [87].
4.2. Effectiveness: Internal Self-Regulation v. Regulation by the Law
The effectiveness of the German Insider Trading Guidelines is very difficult
to judge. It is a fact that a significant number of review panel investigations
have been carried out at those exchanges with such bodies. In addition, people
concerned with and active in the stock exchange and its related businesses
have expressed positive opinions.
The most famous case since the original introduction of the Insider Trading
Guidelines was the take-over offer by the August-Thyssen-Huette AG,
Duisburg, to the shareholders of Rheinstahl AG, Essen (Winter 1972-73). In
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that. case, the review body of the Duesseldorf Stock Exchange carried out a
review not only of both parties concerned, but also of six credit banks and
some 160 individuals. The investigation extended from March to September of
1973 and ultimately included 172 persons and enterprises, many of whom
could be considered insiders based on their relations with Thyssen and
Rheinstahl. In no case could abuses be established [88]. Yet rumors indicated
that there were clear leaks without outright tipping, for example, between
family members.
The financial press has reported other reviews in which no abuses were
established, including the sale of shares during the time of the spectacular
collapse of the Beton- und Monierbau AG [89]. It is difficult to ascertain how
many abuses have been factually established by review bodies due to the right
of the insider to prevent publication of such findings [90].
The voluntary solution then appears to be clearly inferior compared to a
statutory regulation in which the hearings are regularly public and the publica-
tions of the judgment are always public. Furthermore, the notoriously difficult
question of the superiority of internal self-regulation versus statutory regu-
lation (or a meaningful combination) is often posed and never answered
adequately. The conflicting opinions are split into camps similar to those for
the insider problem itself [91]. On the one hand, self-regulation supports the
community spirit of free will and commitment, creates less bureaucratic
expenditure and costs, enhances flexibility of the regulations, is regulated by
those with the best knowledge on the subject, and promotes greater knowledge
and understanding among the parties concerned. On the other hand, statutory
regulation provides greater authority, certainty, and equality through the legal
process, open discussion through hearings preceding enactment of the law,
neutrality of the state authorities appointed by the state, sufficient powers of
full investigation, free choice of sanctions and disclosure, and stimulation of
self-regulation by the codification of the main issue [92].
Aside from the issue of positions on this general problem, there are some
important aspects of the concrete insider problem. By the end of 1978,
practically all the credit banks and 226 enterprises quoted on the stock
exchange (representing 84% of share capital) had recognized the Insider
Trading Guidelines of 1976. If one adds to this figure the 63 enterprises which
still recognize the old version of the Guidelines from 1971, 95.2% of the share
capital quoted on the stock exchange is represented [931. Yet in numbers of
companies, this represents only 50% of the stock corporations quoted on the
stock exchange. Included are all the blue chip and standard values in which
the broad public trades. Not included are many smaller companies, which is a
problem because experience demonstrates that the probability of insider
dealing is greater in medium and small sized companies [94]. However, above
all it must be taken into account that the Insider Trading Guidelines are
limited to shares quoted on the stock exchange or dealt with on the open
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market. Thus, less than a quarter of all German stock corporations come
under the ambit of Insider Trading Guidelines. At the end of 1985, there were
only 450 companies with shares quoted on one of the German stock ex-
changes. While it is true that a number of interesting enterprises have decided
to go public since 1984, it is too early to determine whether this marks a
reversal of the tide [95].
4.3. Reforms and Priorities
At the end of 1982 there were only 2,140 stock corporations, while there
were about 350,000 companies with limited liability (GmbH) [96]. The insider
problem is only one of the many problems confronting the stock corporations
and certainly not the most important [971. Other problems include bleeding
out of the stock corporation as a legal form in practice, bad undercapitaliza-
tion, burdensome legal differences which disadvantage stock corporations
(especially in disclosure [98], problematic tax and co-determination laws), and
revitalization of the exchanges and trading. German lawyers and recently also
economists have addressed the issues; it is now time for the legislators to do
so. Whether the legislature will be courageous enough to deal with these basic
and complex legal reform problems -while it has to enact the European
Economic Community's (EEC) directives on Stock Exchange Law is highly
improbable.
At a time when, despite a clear uprise of the German economy in the past
two years, unemployment, high State indebtedness, and party-political prob-
lems are in the forefront of everyone's mind, there is not much inclination to
initiate such reforms. This is particularly true considering the high costs of
implementation and the necessity of then appointing new authorities. For
these reasons, it is unlikely that Germany will have an insider law - whether
under a state-controlled securities commission or specialized courts and
centralized state prosecutors enforcing criminal statutes - in the foreseeable
future.
4.4. Waiting for Europe?
In 1973, a "European Insider Law" by the EEC was called for [99]. The
EEC Commission took the project in hand initially with a recommendation
regarding the code of behavior in transactions in securities on July 25, 1977
[1001. The Commission then began preliminary work towards a European
directive for the harmonization of law and regulations regarding insider
transactions [101]. The attitude of the German professions is to reject the
EEC's efforts; the German jurisprudence is still waiting. It is certainly
conceivable that Germany will come to a.statutory regulation by means of a
harmonization of company law with EEC directives, as in other cases, most
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notably the Fourth and Seventh Directives which have brought about far-
reaching innovations for German company law and disclosure. However, it is
not certain. The most recent deliberations on the insider trading issue still lean
strongly towards excluding the total complex of sanctions, leaving this matter
to the member states. If one believes that an EEC directive also can be
enforced by a voluntary, non-statutory form of self-regulation in the member
states, then nothing in Germany will change.
5. Conclusion
The unusual legal character and lack of ability to enforce the voluntary
Insider Trading Guidelines make them a less than ideal method for halting the
use of insider information. The four other possible methods of regulation -
penal law, civil liability, company law, and disclosure requirements - currently
have little practical application to the problem.
Though the profession is satisfied with the use of the voluntary Guidelines,
other factions are not. These factions, in concert with the EEC's directives,
may force a change in insider regulation in Germany. If the profession does
not want the problem addressed by strict state laws, the literature and more
and more also the financial press [1021 suggest that it should encourage other
methods of regulation in addition to the voluntary Guidelines. Such a move
would not violate the contractual employment relationship between the insider
and his company. Rather, it would further ensure the effectiveness of the
Guidelines, and thereby support corporate development in Germany as in
other European countries.
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